Analysis | 24 September 2026
An early shipment of Cameroonian tea showed that Africa’s new trade rules could work. The next test is whether businesses can use them every day.
In October 2022, two Cameroonian producers exported 38.6 kilograms of tea to Ghana under Africa’s new free-trade rules. It was a small shipment for a vast ambition. It also posed the question that now hangs over the African Continental Free Trade Area: can a business do it again, at a price that makes the next order worthwhile? The shipment was reported by Cameroon’s National Shippers’ Council.
The agreement has since helped other products move across borders. Yet in a separate East African trade corridor, Kenya and South Sudan are still trying to clear 29 obstacles, from repeated inspections to costly documents and charges. Their talks are bilateral, within an existing regional bloc. The problems they are confronting show what a continent-wide market must overcome.
Nigerian bag maker Chinwe Ezenwa knows how much work sits between an agreement and a sale. Her company, Le Look Nigeria, was among the first Nigerian businesses selected for AfCFTA’s Guided Trade Initiative. In a 2024 interview with Shipping Position Daily, she described having to establish where the materials in her bags came from to obtain a certificate of origin. She also spoke of the production capacity, knowledge and contacts needed to export. A preferential tariff can open a door. It cannot make a shipment move by itself.
The Trade Is Real. The Scale Is the Question.
The agreement was signed in Kigali in March 2018, entered into force in May 2019 and began trading in January 2021. Since then, companies have completed transactions using AfCFTA procedures. The African Union reported that Kenya exported batteries to Ghana and Rwanda issued an AfCFTA certificate of origin for coffee destined for Ghana.
Cameroon’s National Shippers’ Council also reported early exports of dried pineapple and ginger to Ghana. It reported a shipment of resin from Tunisia expected to enter Cameroon under the regime in 2023. These transactions show that the paperwork and preferences can be put to use. They leave open the larger question of whether firms can repeat them at commercial scale.
Financial infrastructure has moved beyond the blueprint, too. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System said its service became available to customers of KCB in Kenya and Bank of Kigali in Rwanda in 2025, allowing payments through participating banks in local currencies. That is useful plumbing for cross-border commerce. It is not, by itself, evidence that AfCFTA has transformed the volume of goods crossing borders.
The distinction matters when judging the agreement. Africa traded with itself long before AfCFTA. An increase in the continent’s total trade cannot simply be credited to the new rules without knowing how much moved under AfCFTA preferences and what would have happened otherwise.
An Old Problem on a New Corridor
Kenya and South Sudan show why the next stage is difficult. The countries already belong to the East African Community, yet officials have agreed to address 29 non-tariff barriers and improve the Nadapal–Juba corridor. The EastAfrican reported disputes over ungazetted checkpoints, repeated inspections, documentation, insurance and container charges. South Sudan’s state broadcaster confirmed an August joint communiqué covering trade obstacles, border security and road links.
This is a bilateral initiative within an existing regional bloc, not a transaction shown to have failed under AfCFTA. Its relevance is the warning it carries for a much larger market. If neighbouring countries with established regional ties still struggle to make a corridor predictable, firms trading across the continent may encounter the same problems on a wider scale.
A tariff concession is worth less to an agricultural processor whose shipment waits at a checkpoint, or to a manufacturer whose delivery price changes with every unexpected fee. Big exporters can sometimes pay specialists to manage such uncertainty. A small firm may decide that a new market is simply too risky.
The agreement has an online mechanism to report non-tariff barriers, including delays and ad hoc fees. Reporting a problem is a start. The business test is whether authorities resolve it, keep it resolved and publish information that other traders can rely on.
There are also gaps before goods reach the border. Exporters need working capital, sufficient production capacity, standards certification and a way to receive payment. In March 2025, Cameroon’s National Shippers’ Council said local businesses taking part in an AfCFTA discussion raised limited production capacity, lack of information and payment systems among their difficulties. Ezenwa’s account gives those institutional concerns a business face: qualifying for a preference requires work well before a truck is loaded.
A Forecast Is Not a Result
The opportunity remains large. UN Economic Commission for Africa modelling suggests that full implementation could make intra-African trade 45% higher by 2045 than it would be without AfCFTA, equivalent to nearly $276 billion in additional trade. It is a conditional forecast, not a measure of gains already delivered.
The commission’s July assessment of Central Africa illustrates the distance between an early shipment and a regional trading system. It said Cameroon was the only country in that subregion to have traded on AfCFTA preferential terms through the Guided Trade Initiative. That narrow finding does not mean its neighbours do no cross-border trade. It means the agreement’s preferential route has yet to become widely usable there.
In September, the commission and DHL Express Sub-Saharan Africa announced a programme to help small firms navigate customs, logistics, digital trade and market access, with attention to women- and youth-led businesses. Training can help an exporter understand the rules. It cannot fix an unfinished road or make an unpredictable charge disappear.
AfCFTA has therefore passed its first test: African goods have moved under its rules, and some of the systems needed to support trade are operating. The more demanding test is repetition. Can the next exporter obtain the same preference without specialist help? Can a buyer count on a delivery date? Can a small producer make a second shipment at a price that still leaves a profit?
Those answers, rather than the size of the market described in an agreement, will determine whether continental trade becomes an ordinary business decision.
