Senegal spent a decade waiting to become an oil and gas country. Then it happened twice in ten months. First oil flowed from the offshore Sangomar field on 11 June 2024. First gas flowed from the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) field, shared with Mauritania, in December 2024, and the first cargo of liquefied natural gas sailed in April 2025. A country that had never produced a barrel of oil is now exporting crude and LNG at the same time.
The fields are performing better than expected. The harder question — the one that will decide whether this is a transformation or a disappointment — is how much of the money reaches Senegal, and what the government does with it.
Sangomar: the oil field
Sangomar sits about 100 kilometres offshore from Dakar, in deep water. The field is operated by Australia’s Woodside Energy, which holds 82% of the project; Senegal’s state oil company, Petrosen, holds 18%. Oil is produced through the FPSO Léopold Sédar Senghor — a floating production vessel named after Senegal’s first president — and loaded onto tankers for export. The first cargo went to Shell.
Phase 1 of the development cost about $5.2 billion and was designed to produce 100,000 barrels a day from about 231 million barrels of recoverable oil. It has run at that plateau almost without interruption: Woodside reported that in the first half of 2025 Sangomar averaged 100,000 barrels a day at 98.6% reliability, and that the field had generated revenue nearing $1 billion in that half-year alone.
The production record so far:
| Period | Crude produced |
|---|---|
| June–December 2024 | 16.9 million barrels — above the 11.7 million target |
| Full year 2025 | 36.1 million barrels |
| First half of 2026 | 17.9 million barrels |
| Since first oil (to mid-2026) | 70.9 million barrels produced; 70.47 million sold |
Do the arithmetic on 2025 and the field’s performance becomes concrete: 36.1 million barrels divided by 365 days is about 99,000 barrels a day — the field ran at its 100,000-barrel plateau for effectively the whole year. The government has raised the 2026 target to 31.6 million barrels, up from an initial forecast of 28.1 million.
GTA: the gas field
The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim field straddles the maritime border between Senegal and Mauritania, and the two countries develop it jointly. The operator is bp, with Kosmos Energy as partner; bp holds about 56% and Kosmos about 27%, while Petrosen holds 10% and Mauritania’s state company SMH holds 7%. Gas is processed on a floating LNG vessel offshore and exported as LNG.
GTA produced its first gas in December 2024 and shipped its first LNG cargo in April 2025, with commercial operations starting in June 2025. Phase 1 is designed for about 2.5 million tonnes of LNG a year, and the field holds an estimated 20 trillion cubic feet of gas. A second phase, which would roughly double output toward 5 million tonnes a year, is under discussion.
There is also a third field in the picture: Yakaar-Teranga, wholly inside Senegalese waters, which is being developed to supply gas for power generation and industry at home — 150 to 250 million cubic feet a day — rather than for export. Senegal has said it wants to end natural gas imports by 2027 and meet domestic demand from its own production.
How much money, and whose is it?
This is where the story gets complicated. Sangomar’s total sales reached about $4 billion from first oil through the end of 2025. But the split of the money is not what most people in Senegal would expect. Between June 2024 and March 2026, the field generated about $4.57 billion in export revenue. Of that, Woodside received about $3.42 billion — 75% — while the Senegalese government, through its direct participation and through Petrosen, received about $1.15 billion, or 25%.
| June 2024 – March 2026 | Share of $4.57bn export revenue |
|---|---|
| Woodside (operator) | $3.42 billion — 75% |
| Senegalese government (direct + Petrosen) | $1.15 billion — 25% |
The reason is cost recovery: under the production-sharing contracts signed under Senegal’s 1998 petroleum code, the operator first recovers the billions it spent building the field, and only then does the profit split tilt toward the state. Petrosen also carries about 800 billion CFA francs of debt from its stakes in the two flagship projects, which will absorb much of the profit that does flow its way.
Put those two numbers side by side and the scale of the problem is clear. Petrosen’s debt of about 800 billion CFA francs is larger than the government’s entire projected hydrocarbon revenue for 2027 to 2029 combined — 703.2 billion CFA francs, of which 397.8 billion is expected in 2027, 168 billion in 2028 and 137.4 billion in 2029. The debt is not the government’s, but it sits on the state company that is supposed to turn oil into national income.
Even so, the money matters. The IMF projected Senegal’s economy would grow 7.9% in 2025, driven largely by oil and gas, and the government is counting on hydrocarbon income to fund infrastructure, power and social programmes. The question is not whether the fields make money. It is when Senegal starts keeping most of it.
The risks
Four risks stand out. The first is the contract itself: the deals for Sangomar and GTA were signed years ago, under a code the current government has said favours the operators, and renegotiating a signed production-sharing contract is slow, expensive and legally fraught. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, elected in 2024 on a promise that petroleum profits would be well managed, has ordered reviews of the contracts; in May 2026 Senegal threatened arbitration against bp over GTA.
The second is refining. Senegal exports almost all of its crude and still imports most of its petrol and diesel — the value is added elsewhere. A planned new refinery, which would add up to 4 million tonnes a year of capacity, is meant to close that gap — but it is still at the planning stage, with no final investment decision taken, and is not built yet.
The third is power at home. Senegal became sub-Saharan Africa’s first LNG importer in 2025 even as it started exporting LNG through GTA, because domestic gas is not yet piped to the power plants around Dakar that need it. Gas-to-power is the plan; the pipes and plants are still catching up.
The fourth is price. Oil at $60 a barrel makes Sangomar a very different proposition from oil at $90, and Senegal’s budget now rises and falls with a commodity it does not control. Senegal’s budget and its IMF programme are already under strain from debt and energy subsidies, and hydrocarbon revenue that arrives late or small makes that strain worse, not better.
What happens next
The next two years will show whether Senegal’s oil story is about production or about income. GTA’s second phase, Yakaar-Teranga’s development for domestic power, and the gas-to-power pipelines will decide whether gas lights Senegalese homes or mostly fills foreign tankers. The contract reviews will decide whether the 75–25 split of the early years gives way to a larger state share as costs are recovered. And the budget will show whether the money is invested or spent.
Senegal has joined Nigeria in the club of African oil producers — but unlike Nigeria, which now refines its own crude at the Dangote refinery, Senegal still sells its crude raw and buys fuel back. Closing that gap, not opening new fields, is the work that will decide what the oil is worth.
















